A Guide to the EPC 2000 - a practitioner's guide to the new law by Nicholas Fox

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Divided by a Common Language: A  Comparison of Patent Claim Interpretation in the English and American Courts

(originally published in the European Intellectual Property Review, December 2004)

 

Modern approach to claim construction in the English Courts

The Patents Act 1977 has been described in the U.K. as a “watershed”.[25] In addition to incorporating the European Patent Convention and the Patent Co-operation Treaty into domestic law, the Act also introduced a statutory definition of infringement into English law. In place of the wording of a patent itself, the Act sets out[26] what types of conduct are capable of being acts of infringement. The Act also provides in section 125 an explicit definition of the extent of protection conferred by a patent. This states that:

(1)        For the purposes of this Act an invention for a patent for which an application has been made or for which a patent has been granted shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be taken to be that specified in a claim of the specification of the application or patent, as the case may be as interpreted by the description and any drawings contained in that specification, and the extent of the protection conferred by a patent or application for a patent shall be determined accordingly.

(3)       The Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the European Patent Convention (which Article contains a provision corresponding to subsection (1) above) shall, as for the time being in force, apply for the purposes of subsection (1) above as it applies for the purposes of that Article.

The wording of the Protocol is as follows:

Article 69 should not be interpreted in the sense that the extent of protection conferred by a European patent is to be understood as that defined by the strict, literal meaning of the words used in the claims, the description and drawings being employed only for the purpose of resolving ambiguity found in the claims. Neither should it be interpreted in the sense that the claims serve only as a guideline and that the actual protection conferred may extend to what, from a consideration of the description and drawings by a person skilled in the art, the patentee has contemplated. On the contrary, it is to be interpreted as defining a position between these extremes which combines a fair degree of protection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties

The origins of the Protocol lie in an attempt to reconcile the previously divergent approaches to claim interpretation in Europe. In contrast to the common law “fence post” approach in which patent protection was closely tied to the wording of the claims, civil law countries such as Germany adopted a “sign post” approach where claims were seen as defining the general inventive concept or “Kerntheorie” of an invention.[27] Under this “sign post” approach a patent would be infringed if the identified inventive concept were utilised even if the infringement did not fall literally within the wording of the claims. With the adoption of the Protocol, the German courts now accept that the claims are no longer merely a pointer towards a claimed inventive concept, and that the claims now define the boundaries of a monopoly.[28] The English Courts have also accepted that the strict literalism of the past and the limited application of the doctrine of the pith and marrow has been superseded by a “purposive” approach to claim construction, where the scope of protection extends beyond its literal meaning to encompass variants of a claimed invention.[29]

Together Article 69 and its Protocol form the basis of modern English claim interpretation. The wording of Article 69 as reflected in section 125 clearly states that the extent of protection conferred by a patent is that defined by the claims as interpreted in light of the specification and drawings. The Protocol then goes on to state that this scope of protection extends beyond the literal meaning of the wording of the claims themselves to include a penumbra of protection which combines a fair degree of protection whilst being limited to the extent that the claims themselves provide third parties with a reasonable degree of certainty as to the scope of protection.

Just as under the common law, therefore, the starting point for determining the scope of a patent remains the wording of the claims. From the Protocol, it can be taken that anything which falls within the literal wording of the claims as properly interpreted necessarily falls within the scope of a patent, as the Protocol identifies the literal interpretation of the claims as being less than the minimum extent of protection. Article 69 also provides guidance as to how the wording of the claims is to be interpreted. It states that the claims are to be interpreted in the light of “the description and any drawings contained in [the accompanying] specification.” Together the provisions of Article 69 therefore identify the claims, description and drawings of a specification as the primary arbiters of determining claim scope.

However, this is not to exclude all other evidence as to the meaning of the claims. In addition to the materials to be used to interpret a claim, it is also necessary to identify from whose viewpoint the claims are to be read. In the U.K., it is well settled that: “patent specifications are intended to be read by persons skilled in the relevant art, but their construction is for the Court. Thus the Court must adopt the mantle of the notional skilled addressee, and determine … what the notional skilled addressee would understand to be the ambit of the claim.”[30] The role of expert evidence in the U.K. is therefore to enable a judge to understand the description, claims and drawings as the man skilled in the art would understand them.

 

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Footnotes

[25] Reid B., A Practical Guide to Patent Law, 2nd edn. ( Sweet & Maxwell, 1993).

[26] s. 60 Patents Act 1977.

[27] G. Aharonian (translator), The Concept of Technical Invention, Deutsches Patent und Markenamt, (Document no. EUROTAB 2/2002e, March 4, 2002).

[28] See for example the comments of the German Federal Supreme Court in Re Formstein [1991] R.P.C. 597 at page 605.

[29] Catnic Components v. Hill & Smith Ltd. [1982] RPC 183 (H.L.) as approved in Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Products [1990] F.S.R 181 (C.A.) and Kastner v. Rizla Ltd. No. 1 [1995] R.P.C. 585 (C.A.).

[30] Lubrizol v. Esso [1998] R.P.C. 727 at page 738.